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Value and Crisis:  
Bichler and Nitzan versus Marx 
 
Andrew Kliman 
 
Editors’ Note: In this article, Andrew Kliman responds to Bichler and Nitzan’s recent paper on 
‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (2010). He then goes on to 
raise a series of issues concerning the critique of Marxian value theory which these authors put 
forward  in  their  book  Capital  as  Power  (Nitzan  and  Bichler,  2009).  It  is  followed  by  a 
rejoinder from Bichler and Nitzan. 
 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
    
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s (B&N) ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and 
the Future of Capitalism’ (Bichler and Nitzan, 2010) argues that ‘systemic fear’ – fear of 
the death of the capitalism – has gripped capitalists during the last decade, as it did during 
the Great Depression. Their evidence for this claim consists of the alleged fact that these 
two periods of crisis were the only periods since World War I in which equity (stock) 
prices and current profits were strongly correlated.1 
  Employing the same methods and data as B&N, Part I of this response shows 
that equity prices and current profits were also strongly correlated during the so-called 
golden age of capitalism! This should cause us to doubt B&N’s claim that systemic fear 
has prevailed in recent years. I then argue that flaws in their reasoning should also cause 
us to doubt their claim that capitalists are normally convinced that capitalism is eternal, as 
well as their claim that this conviction is crucial to its continued existence. But if the future 
of capitalism doesn’t hinge on the conviction that the system is eternal, it also doesn’t 
much matter whether capitalists have recently been gripped by systemic fear in B&N’s 
sense.  
Good old regular fear, “the dread and apprehension that regularly puncture 
[capitalists’] habitual greed” (Bichler and Nitzan, 2010, p. 18), is another matter. There 
can be little doubt that good old regular fear was intense at the start of the last decade, and 
even more intense at the end.  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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I believe that this good old regular fear was justified and that it remains so. The 
underlying long-run economic problems that led to the recent Great Recession, and to 
the  weakness  of  the  subsequent  recovery,  have  not  been  resolved.  Slow  growth  of 
employment relative to investment during the last six decades has led to a persistent fall in 
the  rate  of  profit;  the  fall  in  the  rate  of  profit  has  caused  capital  accumulation  and 
economic growth to be sluggish for decades; and this sluggishness has led to mounting 
debt burdens (see Kliman, 2011). I doubt that the fall in the rate of profit can be reversed 
or that the debt problem can be solved without much more destruction of capital value –
i.e. falling prices of real estate, securities, and means of production, as well as physical 
destruction – than has taken place to date. And if these problems remain unresolved, the 
economy will continue to be relatively stagnant and prone to crisis. 
But it is difficult to discuss these ideas with B&N, or at all, because they and 
others like them contend that the theory on which the ideas are based, Marx’s value 
theory, is internally inconsistent and circular. An internally inconsistent theory cannot 
possibly be correct.2 All ideas resting upon such a foundation can thus be disqualified at 
the  starting  gate,  without  further  ado.  In  order  to  clear  the  ground  for  a  genuine 
discussion  –  one  in  which  B&N’s  approach  to  questions  of  crisis  and  the  future  of 
capitalism is compared with and contrasted to something rather than nothing – Part II of 
this paper responds to the main criticisms of Marx’s value theory contained in their 
recent book, Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). In the course of that response, 
I  will  discuss  inter  alia  how  Marx’s  value  theory  helps  to  illuminate  the  long-term 
difficulties  that  led  to  the  Great  Recession  and  its  “new  normal”  aftermath.  Part  III 
concludes. 
 
I. I. I. I. ‘Systemic Fear’  ‘Systemic Fear’  ‘Systemic Fear’  ‘Systemic Fear’ and Capitalists’ Convictions  and Capitalists’ Convictions  and Capitalists’ Convictions  and Capitalists’ Convictions    
    
B&N (2010, p. 17) argue that “if we adhere to the scriptures of modern finance, we 
should expect to see no systematic association between equity prices and current profits.” 
And they claim that equity prices have indeed become decoupled from current profits 
since 1917, except during two brief and exceptional periods. “Figure 2 and Table 2 show 
two clear exceptions to the rule: the first occurred during the 1930s, the second during 
the 2000s. In both periods … equity prices moved together—and tightly so—with 
current earnings” (Bichler and Nitzan 2010, p. 17) [emphasis altered]. 
However, their Figure 2 actually shows four clear exceptions to the alleged rule. 
Equity prices also moved together with current earnings – and tightly so – from the early 
1950s to the early 1960s, and from the early 1960s to the early 1970s (see my Figure 1). 
During the first of these additional “exceptional” periods, period 4 of my Table 1, the 
correlation between equity prices and current earnings was stronger than during the 
Great Depression (period 2). During the other “exceptional” period that B&N fail to Value and Crisis, Kliman
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bring to our attention, period 5, the correlation was lower, but still considerably stronger 
than during the 2000s (period 7).3 The percentage of the variation in one variable that is 
“explained” by, or attributable to, the variation in the other is the square of the correlation 
coefficient, r2. Thus, as Table 1 shows, only about two-fifths of the variation in share prices 
during period 7 is attributable to variations in current profits; the explained variation 
during period 4 is almost twice as great, while the explained variation during period 5 is 
more than 50% greater.4 
Table  1  also  shows  that  share  prices  have  been  strongly  and  positively 
correlated with current profits more than 40% of the time since 1917, and almost half the 
time since 1929. So the “exceptions” are not exceptional; the “rule” that share prices and 
current profits have become decoupled is no rule at all.  
    
    
Figure 1.  Figure 1.  Figure 1.  Figure 1. S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 19 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 19 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 19 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1953 53 53 53– – – –1962 & 1962 1962 & 1962 1962 & 1962 1962 & 1962– – – –1973 (3 1973 (3 1973 (3 1973 (3- - - -
year moving averages of annual rates of change) year moving averages of annual rates of change) year moving averages of annual rates of change) year moving averages of annual rates of change)    
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Table 1.  Table 1.  Table 1.  Table 1. S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Annual Rates of  S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Annual Rates of  S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Annual Rates of  S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Annual Rates of 
Growth of Price and Earn Growth of Price and Earn Growth of Price and Earn Growth of Price and Earnings per Share  ings per Share  ings per Share  ings per Share     
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving averages) 
    
Period  Number of months 
Correlation 
(r) 
Share-price variation 
explained (r2) 
1  Oct. 1917  –  Dec. 1929  146  0.29  8% 
2  Dec. 1929  –  Feb. 1939  110  0.89  79% 
3  Feb. 1939  –  June 1953  172  –0.34  12% 
4  June 1953  –  Aug. 1962  110  0.90  81% 
5  Aug. 1962  –  Dec. 1973  136  0.80  65% 
6  Dec. 1973  –  Sept. 2000  321  –0.20  4% 
7  Sept. 2000  –  Mar. 2010  114  0.65  42% 
   
Strongly positive-correlation periods: 2, 4, 5, and 7 
 
42% of total months since Oct. 1917; 49% of total months since Dec. 1929 
 
But B&N haven’t merely gotten their facts wrong. Because their facts are wrong, so is 
their paper’s key claim that we can infer that investors are gripped by “systemic fear” when 
the relationship between current profits and equity prices is strong and positive. They tell 
us that the two periods in which systemic fear prevailed were two periods of acute crisis, 
the Great Depression and the 2000s. If a strongly positive correlation between current 
profits and share prices were another exceptional feature of these periods of crisis, then 
the notion that we can infer the existence of systemic fear from the positive correlation 
might be plausible. But the 1930s and 2000s were not exceptional in that respect, as we 
have seen. And the other two strongly positive-correlation periods, which run from the 
early  1950s  through  the  early  1970s,  cannot  plausibly  be  characterized  as  a  time  of 
systemic fear. On the contrary, that era was the so-called golden age of capitalism.5 So a 
strongly positive correlation between current profits and equity prices does not allow us 
to infer the existence of systemic fear. 
But the correlation data are B&N’s only evidence that capitalists were gripped 
by systemic fear in the 1930s and 2000s. (The statements by the Financial Times, Alan 
Greenspan, Bernie Sucher, Gillian Tett, and Mervyn King quoted in their paper discuss a 
highly uncertain environment, economic crisis, and discredited economic theory and 
ideology, not fear of the death of capitalism.) So they have not given us a good reason to 
accept that claim. Value and Crisis, Kliman
 
 
 
65 
Nor do they give us a good reason to accept that the opposite of systemic fear –
the  conviction  that  capitalism  is  eternal  –  is  the  norm.  Their  ‘demonstration’  that 
capitalists are almost always guided by this conviction is fatally flawed. And since the 
same demonstration is the basis upon which B&N (2010, p. 3) claim that “[t]his … 
conviction is necessary for the existence of modern capitalism, at least in its present form,” 
they also fail to give us a good reason to accept this latter claim.  
The most glaring flaw in their ‘demonstration’ comes at the end, when they 
write, “the fact that capitalists invest shows that they expect … that the value of their 
assets will grow, not contract – and that expectation means that, consciously or not, they 
also think that the ritual that valuates their assets will never end” (Bichler and Nitzan, 
2010, pp. 3-4) [emphasis added]. The italicised clause is simply false. Just as some people 
buy lottery tickets even if they don’t expect to hit the jackpot, some people buy shares of 
stock even if they don’t expect their prices to rise. A large enough jackpot or a large 
enough  potential  capital  gain  more  than  makes  up  for  a  low  probability  of  success.  
Hence, the fact that people invest does not mean that they normally expect capitalism to 
last forever.  
Imagine, for instance, that you think that there’s only a 50-50 chance that 
capitalism will exist a year from now, and that you are considering buying shares of stock 
for $10,000 today. If capitalism doesn’t survive, you’ll lose the whole $10,000, so it would 
be better to spend the $10,000 now, not invest it. You believe that this outcome is as likely 
as  not,  but  you  also  believe  that  if  capitalism  does  survive,  the  shares  will  be  worth 
$500,000 a year from now. If you are like most people, you’ll go ahead and invest. 
  Secondly, dozens upon dozens of experiments conducted by Nobel laureate 
Vernon Smith and colleagues (e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Porter and 
Smith,  2003)  during  the  past  quarter  century  have  demonstrated  conclusively  that 
people frequently invest in assets even when know that “capitalism” (i.e., its experimental 
equivalent) will soon perish. Participants in the experiments are given some cash and 
some shares of an imaginary equity. They are told that the shares will pay dividends for a 
fixed length of time, such as fifteen periods, and that the experiment will then end, at 
which point the shares will be worthless. The current fundamental value of a share – the 
sum of the average per-period dividends throughout the remainder of the experiment – is 
announced at the start of each period.6 Participants can buy additional shares from other 
participants, sell their shares, or hold onto them and collect their dividends. At the end of 
the experiment, they get to keep their initial cash endowments, dividends, and any net 
capital gains they have obtained.   
Now, B&N (2010, p. 3) claim to demonstrate that if capitalists believed that 
the system “would cease to exist at some future point,” then share prices “would have no-
where to trend but down,” and capitalists would therefore be unwilling to buy additional Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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shares. But even though participants in the experiments are absolutely certain that the 
system (i.e., the experiment) will soon cease to exist and that the asset’s fundamental 
value is continually falling, share prices typically rise throughout much or most of the 
experiment – big bubbles are formed – and the volume of investment in additional shares 
is typically heavy. This has been the routine outcome even when the participants in the 
experiments  are  over-the-counter  stock  dealers,  businesspeople,  or  students  at  the 
California Institute of Technology or the Wharton School.  
Research into why this ‘perverse’ behavior occurs is still ongoing, but the basic 
reason why people buy shares that eventually become worthless, and whose prices must 
therefore eventually fall, is obvious. People think that they may well make a substantial 
profit in the meantime, by reselling the shares at prices higher than those they paid.  
Finally, even if the rest of B&N’s ‘demonstration’ were sound, it would not 
prove that capitalists are normally guided by the conviction that capitalism is eternal. At 
least it wouldn’t prove this if we use the word “conviction” in the normal way. B&N are 
undoubtedly  aware  that  it  would  not,  since  they  write  that  “consciously  or  not, 
[capitalists] also think that the ritual that valuates their assets will never end” [emphasis 
added].  I doubt that “unconscious conviction” is a coherent concept, but even if it is, 
B&N’s appeal to it turns what started out as a provocative and straightforward claim into 
a piece of unfalsifiable Freudian speculation.7 
 
II. Nitzan and Bichler’s Critique of Marx II. Nitzan and Bichler’s Critique of Marx II. Nitzan and Bichler’s Critique of Marx II. Nitzan and Bichler’s Critique of Marx    
    
Marx’s supposed logical errors are a major theme of Nitzan and Bichler’s (N&B’s) recent 
book.8 They put forward what they call an “alternative” to both “mainstream and Marxist 
political economy” (p. xxv), and their main justification for doing so is technical and 
logical: Marx’s value theory and mainstream economics are riddled with “circularities and 
contradictions” (p. 144). And since these theories are logically unsound, N&B argue, 
their alternative is not merely something they prefer; it and its further development are 
needed,  objectively  (p.  144).  Because  N&B  focus  on  the  logical  issues  at  stake,  my 
commentary shall do so as well, though I shall also discuss how Marx’s value theory can 
help us understand the long-term problems that resulted in the Great Recession.  
This part of the paper begins with a discussion of how N&B critique Marx for 
alleged methodological sins that they themselves commit. I then consider their critique of 
Marx’s theory that real-world prices and profit are determined by the production of value 
and surplus-value. I will respond to their allegation––or, rather, their repetition of a hoary 
allegation––that Marx’s theory of the value-price relationship is internally inconsistent. I 
will also respond to their critique of the temporal single-system interpretation (TSSI) of 
Marx’s value theory, an interpretation that refutes this and other allegations that the 
theory is inconsistent.9 Finally, I discuss their criticisms of Marx’s distinction between Value and Crisis, Kliman
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productive and unproductive labour, his concept of abstract labour, and the manner in 
which he “reduced” complex (skilled) labour to simple (unskilled) labour. 
    
A. Stone A. Stone A. Stone A. Stone- - - -Throwing Throwing Throwing Throwing    
    
N&B complain that “Marx nowhere explains why the additional value-creating capacity 
of skilled labour should bear any particular relationship to the labour cost of acquiring the 
skill. The fact that an engineer trains 10 per cent longer does not mean she will create 10 
per cent more value; it could also be 1 per cent, 20 per cent or any other number” (p. 
142). Yet when they come to their own theory, they tell us that if one company’s market 
capitalization is a thousand times as great as the average capitalization, its owners are a 
thousand times as powerful as the owners of an average company (p. 313). Why 1000 
times as powerful, and not 100 times or 2000 times or any other number?  
They  wish  this  problem  away  by  defining  power  in  terms  of  market 
capitalization: a market cap that is 1000 times as great as the average doesn’t give the 
owners  1000  times  as  much  power;  it  simply  is  1000  times  as  much  power.  This 
identification of capital and power––capital as power––is certainly not correct in a literal 
sense. As N&B (p. 312) cheerfully admit, it is a “figurative identity.” This means that 
Capital as Power is a work of fiction, or what they call a “scientific story” (p. 313).10 
Although they throw stones at Marx for quantifying the unquantifiable, they themselves 
live in a glass house.  
  In other words, if we were to assume for the sake of argument that all of their 
many technical objections to Marx’s value theory are valid, he would then be guilty of 
exactly  what  N&B  are  guilty  of  –  measuring  what  cannot  be  measured,  creating  a 
“figurative  identity”  between  things  that  are  not  identical,  and  using  these  fictional 
measures and identities to tell a “scientific story.” So what entitles them to criticize (what 
they take to be) his method, given that it is their method as well? Their apparent answer 
to this question is that  
… we have seen what happened to liberal and Marxist analyses when they tried 
to imitate th[e] rigour [of natural science]. They pretended that there is a strict 
quantitative correspondence between prices, production and accumulation on 
the one hand and utility and labour values on the other, and then fell flat on 
their faces when they tried to demonstrate this correspondence. (p. 313) 
 
Now, N&B themselves pretend that there is a strict quantitative correspondence between 
power and market capitalization. In that respect, then, there is no difference between their 
method and the method that Marx allegedly employed. Thus the only difference is that Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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they refrain from trying to demonstrate their pretend correspondence; they simply assert 
it as a “figurative identity.” But a glass house is no more shatterproof when one admits that 
it is made of glass than when one tries to demonstrate that it is made of brick. So N&B are 
still not entitled to throw stones. 
 
B. Marx’s Alleged Inconsistency B. Marx’s Alleged Inconsistency B. Marx’s Alleged Inconsistency B. Marx’s Alleged Inconsistency    
 
N&B’s allegation that Marx’s value theory is internally inconsistent focuses mainly on his 
account of the relationship between commodities’ values and their average prices (price 
of production). Marx claimed to show that the “law of value” on which Capital is based 
holds true at the level of the economy as a whole, even though the prices that individual 
companies and industries receive for their products deviate from the products’ actual 
values.11 He argued that these price-value deviations merely cause value and surplus-value 
(profit) to be distributed differently; they do not alter the economy-wide aggregate value 
of output, aggregate surplus-value, or the economy-wide rate of profit. As N&B (pp. 99-
100) recognize,     
These aggregate equalities are crucial. … [T]he rate of profit in price terms is 
equal to the rate of profit in value terms. It is through this determination of the 
rate of profit that the value system anchors the price system. … Marx claimed 
his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it did 
something  they  couldn’t:  it  objectively  derived  the  rate  of  profit  from  the 
material conditions of the labour process.  
But they claim that Marx has been proven wrong. “Bortkiewicz … demonstrated that 
Marx’s solution of pulling and redistributing is logically inconsistent” and that “it could be 
fixed only by making the rate of profit independent of the value system” (p. 99-100). 
  Yet  N&B’s  discussion  of  Marx’s  alleged  inconsistency  is  itself  internally 
inconsistent. A few pages later, when discussing the TSSI, they implicitly shift to an 
agnostic  position  on  the  internal  inconsistency  question.  In  their  discussion  of  the 
temporal aspect of the TSSI, they write, “There is really no way to decide which of these 
two methods [temporal valuation or simultaneous valuation] is ‘valid’. … there is no 
objective yardstick … to tell us which method to use” (p. 107). And when they discuss 
the single-system aspect of the TSSI, they write, “Proponents of the TSSI argue that this is 
what Marx had in mind. And maybe they are right” (p. 109). But if one aspect of the TSSI 
is not invalid, and its only other aspect is possibly what Marx had in mind, then the TSSI 
is possibly a correct exegetical interpretation of Marx’s theory.12 And since this possibly 
correct interpretation eliminates the apparent internal inconsistencies in his theory, a fact 
that N&B accept,13 it follows that the charge of inconsistency is possibly false. So while Value and Crisis, Kliman
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they wish to convict Marx of inconsistency, their own arguments imply that he is possibly 
not guilty. 
 
Price vs. Money, Value vs. Labour-time 
 
N&B’s critiques of Marx and the TSSI are marred by a great many inaccuracies, most of 
which seem to stem from their apparent belief that Marx measured commodities’ values 
exclusively in terms of labour-time, and not also in terms of money. For instance, they 
refer to “the issue of ‘transforming the resulting labour values into money prices,” and 
they assert that, “according to Marx, the value of a commodity denotes the abstract labour 
time necessary for its production” (p. 89, p. 96, emphases added). This belief is entirely 
unwarranted.  
  It is true that, in recent decades, many ‘Marxian economists’ have measured 
prices exclusively in money terms but values exclusively in labour-time terms – perhaps as 
a way of justifying their dual-system interpretations and revisions of Marx’s theory –but 
Marx himself did not do so. In chapter 1 of Capital, vol. 1, he analyzed the “money form” 
of value, and he noted at the start of chapter 3 that “Money as a measure of value is the 
necessary form of appearance of the measure of value that is immanent in commodities, 
namely labour-time” (Marx 1990a, p. 188). And Capital is chock-full of examples in 
which values are measured in money terms. Here are a few, from chapters 7, 8, and 9: 
 
… the sum of the values of the commodities thrown into the process [of yarn 
production] amounts to  27 shillings. The value of the yarn is 30 shillings. 
Therefore  the  value  of  the  product  is  one-ninth  greater  than  the  value 
advanced to produce it; 27 shillings have turned into 30 shillings; a surplus-
value of 3 shillings has been precipitated.  
 
However useful a given … means of production may be, even if it cost £150 or, 
say, 500 hours of labour, it cannot under any circumstances add more than 
£150 to the value of the product.  
 
[During]  six  hours  of  labour  he  [the  worker]  has  added  a  value  of  three 
shillings. This value is the excess of the total value of the product over the 
portion of its value contributed by the means of production.  
 
[T]he  value  of  this  commodity  is  (£410  constant  [capital]  +  £90  variable 
[capital]) + £90 surplus[-value]. The original capital has now changed from … 
£500 to £590. The difference is s, or a surplus-value of £90. [Marx 1990a, p. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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301, p. 314, p. 316, p. 320] 
 
Because they are apparently unfamiliar with the fact that Marx measured value in terms of 
money  as  well  as  labour-time,  N&B  think  that  labour-time  values  need  to  be 
“transformed” or “converted” into money prices.14 They thus seriously misunderstand the 
issue that Marx addressed in his account of the transformation of values into prices of 
production, and Bortkiewicz’s critique of that account, and the single-system aspect of the 
TSSI. They tell us that the “transformation problem” controversy is about Marx having 
supposedly mixed and matched variables measured in terms of labour time and variables 
measured in terms of money:   
According  to  Bortkiewicz,  the  inconsistency  occurs  because  Marx’s 
transformation is incomplete. It converts surplus value counted in labour time 
into profits counted in [money] prices, but it does not do the same for constant 
and variable capital. The resulting price system therefore is half-baked––partly 
[money] price denominated, partly [labour-time] value denominated. (p. 99) 
This is simply not the case. The controversy pertains exclusively to alleged quantitative 
discrepancies between values and prices, and between surplus-value and profit. It has 
nothing to do with the units in which the variables are measured. (At least it had nothing 
to  do  with  units  of  measurement  before  poorly  informed  commentators  on  the 
controversy got their hands on it a few decades ago). In other words, the controversy 
deals with the following kind of question: If the value of output and surplus-value in the 
economy as a whole are $120 trillion and $15 trillion, must the price of output and profit 
also be $120 trillion and $15 trillion, or can they be, say, $105 trillion and $25 trillion? It 
has nothing to do with whether a total price of $105 trillion is equal or unequal to a total 
value of 1.2 trillion labour-hours; the very question is meaningless. 
Bortkiewicz understood perfectly well that Marx measured value in terms of 
money: 
the theory of the equality of total value and total price—a theorem to which 
Marx and the Marxists attach so great an importance—is generally wrong. 
…This situation is in no way altered by the fact that Marx thought of values 
and  prices  in  terms  of  money.  (Bortkiewicz,  1952,  pp.  10–11)  [emphasis 
added] 
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Bortkiewicz’s ‘Proof’ 
 
Thus, when he claimed to prove that Marx’s account of the transformation was internally 
inconsistent, Bortkiewicz did not allege that Marx mixed and matched labour-time and 
money  variables.  He  argued  that  Marx’s  account  led  to  spurious  quantitative 
discrepancies between, for instance, the amount of G (gold) spent to purchase machines 
and the amount of G charged by the producers of replacement machines. And he claimed 
to  prove  that  this  discrepancy  implied  a  spurious  “break[...]  down”  of  the  economy 
(Bortkiewicz, 1952, pp. 8–10), because the amount of G spent to purchase machines may 
well fall far short of what is needed to replace used-up machines.  
  But this ‘proof’ has itself been disproved (see, e.g., Kliman, 2007, ch. 8). The 
crux of the refutation is the recognition of a very simple fact: the amount of gold (or 
accounting money, etc.) received by the producers of replacement machines and the 
amount of gold spent on the original machines can and generally do differ, because the 
original machines are bought before the replacement machines are sold. Consequently, 
the  difference  between  these  two  amounts  does  not  mean  that  the  amount  of  gold 
received by the producers of the replacement machines differs from the amount of gold 
spent on replacement machines, and it therefore does not imply any spurious breakdown 
of the economy. Notice that just as the “proof” does not involve any issue of units of 
measurement, neither does the refutation.  
  More  than  two  decades  have  passed  since  the  refutation  of  Bortkiewicz’s 
“proof” was first published, and it has yet to be disproved itself. Laibman (2004, p.10), the 
only critic of Marx to have addressed it in print, has acknowledged that the refutation 
demonstrates that “Reproduction equilibrium exists between periods.” In other words, 
Marx’s account does not imply a spurious breakdown of the economy.  
  N&B (p. 99 and p. 99 n12) endorse Bortkiewicz’s proof, but fail to explain 
why. They do not demonstrate that the refutation contains any error. They do not even 
acknowledge its existence, even though they certainly should be aware of it, since they cite 
three works (Kliman and McGlone, 1999; Kliman, 2004; Kliman, 2007) in which the 
refutation prominently appears.  
Their silence on this matter is quite important, since what is at stake is the 
logical validity of Marx’s theory that the “price” rate of profit of the real world is equal to 
and determined by the “value” rate of profit, i.e., the ratio of the amount of surplus-value 
pumped out of the workforce to the sum of value invested. Having supposedly proved 
that Marx’s account was internally inconsistent, Bortkiewicz (1984) went on to produce a 
“correction” that fails to preserve this crucial aggregate equality. Yet if his proof is false, 
there  is  nothing  to  correct.  Marx’s  theory  of  how  the  real-world  rate  of  profit  is Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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determined cannot properly be rejected by appealing to Bortkiewicz’s results. But that is 
what N&B do.  
 
Single-System Valuation 
 
Their apparent failure to understand that Marx measured values in terms of both labour-
time and money also causes them to misunderstand the single-system aspect of the TSSI, 
and to allege that Marx’s value theory becomes a “tautology” and a “dogma” when it is 
understood as a single-system theory (p. 109).15 Once values and prices are no longer 
conceived as being determined in two separate systems, they argue, there is “nothing to 
transform in the first place”: 
The conventional Marxist approach argues that labour values are the cause of 
prices.  This  causal  link  is  meaningful  because  the  definitions  of  the  two 
magnitudes are different. Prices  are counted in money,  whereas values are 
counted in labour time. …  
 
The setup of the TSSI is completely different. Here, there is no point in asking 
whether or not prices are equal to values, simply because values are defined by 
market prices. … Labour is still held responsible, by definition, for the creation 
of  all  value  in  the  aggregate.  But  it  is  no  longer  necessary  for  any  of  the 
underlying computations. …  
 
And since value is made proportionate to both price and labour time, it follows 
that prices are proportionate to labour time and that the labour theory of value 
is true before we even begin. … 
 
[The result] is not a scientific theory in the sense of cause X (value) explaining 
consequence Y (price). (pp. 108–109) [emphases in original] 
 
These  objections  are  based  on  N&B’s  mistaken  belief  that  Marx  measured  values 
exclusively in labour-time terms and their consequent mistaken belief he tried to explain 
how labour-time magnitudes are transformed into monetary ones in his account of the 
transformation of values into prices of production. If these beliefs were correct, then the 
fact that the TSSI understands both the values and the prices of Marx’s transformation 
account as monetary magnitudes would indeed imply what N&B think it implies, namely 
that the TSSI construes the values as well as the prices as price magnitudes rather than as 
value magnitudes. Hence, there would be “nothing to transform in the first place,” and 
“the labour theory of value [would be] true before we even begin.” It would also be an Value and Crisis, Kliman
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empty tautology and a dogma. But since N&B’s beliefs are not correct, none of these 
conclusions follow from the fact that values and prices are both measured in terms of 
money. 
First of all, when the total value and total price of output are both understood 
as monetary sums, there still remains a “point in asking whether or not prices are equal to 
values”  because  it  is  conceivable  that  they  differ  quantitatively.  For  instance,  if  the 
capitalist class were able to create profit, in the aggregate, by selling commodities for more 
than they are actually worth – i.e., if monopolies and other firms that reap extra profit in 
this way were able to do so without reducing other firms’ profits to the same degree – 
then total price (the aggregate monetary value received) would exceed total value (the 
aggregate monetary value produced). But Marx demonstrated in chapter 5 of Capital, 
volume 1 that extra value cannot originate in this way in the economy as a whole, and his 
account of the transformation of values into prices of production in chapter 9 of volume 3 
is based on the same principle. Indeed, the overriding purpose of that account is to show 
that the existence of quantitative price-value deviations in individual industries does not 
contradict  the  notion  that  total  price  and  profit  are  determined  by  and  equal 
(quantitatively) to total value and surplus-value.  
And contrary to what N&B claim, “cause X (value) explain[s] consequence Y 
(price)” is affirmed by the TSSI as well. In the first paragraph of the passage I quoted at 
the start of this section, they seem to suggest that causal links are meaningful only when 
the cause and the effect are measured in different units. This is simply not the case. The 
$10 million in retirement taxes that a government collects is the “cause” (source) of the 
$10 million in benefits that retirees receive, because the collection precedes the receipt 
and the prior collection of $10 million fully accounts for the receipt of $10 million. The 
fact that the tax revenue collected is measured in dollars rather than in labour-hours does 
not make the causal connection meaningless. By the same token, in Marx’s theory and in 
the temporal single-system interpretation of that theory, the production of value and 
surplus-value precedes the receipt of value and profit by means of sale, and the prior 
production of value and surplus-value fully accounts for the amounts of sales revenue and 
profit received.  
B&N’s claim that “Labour … is no longer necessary for any of the underlying 
[TSSI]  computations”  is  also  incorrect.  As  Table  2  illustrates,  labour  is  a  crucial 
determinant.16 The total price of output is $100 because the total value of output is $100, 
and the total value of output is $100 because workers’ labour added $60 of new value 
(and  $40  of  existing  value  was  preserved  and  transferred  to  the  products  during 
production). And workers’ labour added $60 of new value because, only because, value-
creating workers performed 60 minutes of work and each minute of their work created $1 
of new value. The example simply stipulates the amount of new value that was created by Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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a minute of work, but this magnitude is in fact determined by actual data, prior to the start 
of production, and it can be estimated using available national account data (though 
N&B  will  surely  say  that  the  estimates  are  just  as  “meaningless”  as  official  inflation 
estimates, which they also dismiss (p. 135). In sum, causation proceeds from left to right, 
following the arrow of time, so the total price of output, and thus total profit and the 
average real-world rate of profit, are determined by, but not determinants of, the other 
variables.17   
    
Table 2 Table 2 Table 2 Table 2    
 
  Pre-production     During production  Post-production 
 
Branch 
Value transferred 
from used-up means 
of production (a) 
Value added by 
living labour (b) 
Total value of 
output (a + b) 
Total 
price 
of output 
$30  20 labour-minutes ￿ 
$20 
$50  $65 
1 
2 
$10  40 labour-minutes ￿ 
$40 
$50  $35 
 
Total 
 
$40  60 labour-minutes ￿ 
$60 
$100  $100 
    
Temporal Valuation 
 
I turn now to N&B’s discussion of the other aspect of the TSSI, temporal valuation. As I 
noted above (see note 12), their discussion of whether it is the right “method to use” and 
their  agnostic  position  on  this  matter  are  not  germane  to  the  issue  of  the  logical 
consistency of Marx’s theory. When the theory is construed as temporal (and single-
system), it is consistent. If temporal valuation is not the right method to use, then the 
theory is consistent but wrong, which has no bearing on whether the TSSI is a correct 
exegetical interpretation.   
  However, N&B seem to suggest that it might not be a correct interpretation for 
a different reason. “According to Michael Perelman (1990), Marx himself left the issue 
open. He used antecedent (past) labour at the micro level of the firm and coexisting 
(current) labour at the macro level of capitalism as a whole” (p. 107). But Perelman’s 
argument supports the TSSI, because the production of commodities and their values 
takes place at the “micro level.” As he noted, “Marx held to the notion that the production 
of an individual commodity should be framed in the context of antecedent labour, as a Value and Crisis, Kliman
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succession of isolated labour processes... Co-existing labour is more appropriate for a 
discussion of ‘the production process in its continuous motion and in the entirety of its 
conditions, and not merely as an isolated action or a limited part of it’” (Perelman, 1990, 
p.  68). [Emphasis added; the interior quote is from Marx]. 
  Although N&B say that temporal valuation is not invalid, they also write that:   
the TSSI allows each barrel of oil to have its own value – depending on its 
particular temporal position in the production process. This difference allows 
the TSSI to appear more theoretically ‘robust’ than its conventional alternative 
– but that appearance is misleading. Obviously, if the same commodity can 
have multiple values, the likelihood of the valuation system as a whole being 
logically inconsistent is much reduced. (2009, p. 107) 
 
It is very hard to make sense of this statement. Isn’t logical consistency a crucial part of 
what makes a theory or interpretation robust? Doesn’t the fact that the TSSI eliminates 
the apparent inconsistencies in Marx’s theory therefore make it a more robust exegetical 
interpretation? N&B make it seem as though logical inconsistency is a good thing.  
Perhaps they meant to argue that it is easier to achieve consistency when one 
relaxes the restrictions imposed on a problem. That is certainly true, but robustness and 
difficulty are two different things. Kepler’s theory of planetary motion is more robust than 
Copernicus’ because it is more consistent with the facts, and it is more consistent with the 
facts because he relaxed the restrictions imposed on the problem – he did not try to force 
planets to move in circles. Or perhaps N&B meant to argue that although Marx’s theory 
is internally consistent when it is understood as a temporal theory, it becomes less robust 
in some other respect. But if this is what they meant, it is hardly an argument, since they 
fail to identify any other respect in which it becomes less robust.  
 
Monopoly Prices and Limits to Monopoly Power 
 
N&B argue that “the labour theory of value requires perfect competition” and that the 
“existence of … power institutions and processes” such as monopolies, oligopolies, and 
government intervention “makes labour values … practically useless for the study of 
actual prices and accumulation” (p. 91). For this and other reasons, “the development of 
capitalism [has] undermined [his] logic” (p. 84).  
But  Marx’s  value  theory  simply  does  not  require  perfect  competition.  He 
devoted two hundred pages of Capital to an analysis of land rent and agricultural prices 
that include rent as a component. As Marx (1991, p. 897) noted, “agricultural products 
are always sold at a monopoly price.” This is because a condition that is needed for Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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perfect competition to exist is absent in this case; the scarcity of arable land makes it 
difficult for new suppliers of land to enter the market. 
So  the  emergence  of  monopolies  and  oligopolies  as  a  dominant  presence 
throughout the economy has not undermined Marx’s logic. His analysis of monopoly 
price predates this new phenomenon, and monopoly prices (as well as market prices that 
differ from average prices and other prices besides perfectly-competitive ones) can be 
understood in a manner consistent with his value theory. N&B seem to think that prices 
can  be  “set  ‘arbitrarily’  without  any  necessary  link  to  production  prices”  if  perfect 
competition does not exist (p. 91). Marx was either aware of or anticipated this objection, 
and he responded to it, once again, by making use of his demonstration that capitalists 
cannot  create  additional  profit  at  the  level  of  the  economy  as  a  whole  by  selling 
commodities for more than they are actually worth: 
 [If] a monopoly price becomes possible …, this does not mean that the limits 
fixed  by  commodity  value  are  abolished.  A  monopoly  price  for  certain 
products simply transfers a portion of the profit made by other commodity 
producers  to  the  commodities  with  the  monopoly  price.  …  [it]  leaves 
unaffected the limit of surplus-value itself. (Marx 1991, p. 1001) [emphasis 
added] 
The prices of individual products depend and have always depended on a great many 
factors, not only the amount of labour needed to reproduce them. But this does not imply 
that their values are “practically useless for the study of actual prices.” I do not see how 
struggles over intellectual property rights can be fruitfully understood without appealing 
to the principle that commodities’ values are determined by the amount of labour needed 
to reproduce them. This principle certainly does not account for the current prices of 
things like software, but it does account for software owners’ fierce struggle to protect 
their monopoly rights. If the law permitted software to be reproduced freely, its price 
would plummet to almost nothing, because almost no labour is needed to reproduce it 
and thus the cost of reproducing it is negligible.18 
For another example, one of the most significant economic phenomena of our 
time  is  the  dramatic  fall  in  computer  prices.  The  average  price  of  ‘computers  and 
peripheral equipment’ declined by 99.99% during the 50 years between 1959 and 2009.19 
Can there be any doubt that this decline is due predominantly to a massive increase in 
productivity, i.e., a massive reduction in the amount of labour needed to reproduce a unit 
of computing power?  
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Falling Rates of Profit and Accumulation Underlying the Great Recession 
 
Computers are an extreme example, but not an isolated one. A decade ago, the orthodox 
Marxist who headed the Federal Reserve noted that  
[F]aster productivity growth keeps a lid on unit costs and prices. Firms 
hesitate to raise prices for fear that their competitors will be able, with 
lower costs from new investments, to wrest market share from them. 
Indeed,  the  increased  availability  of  labour-displacing  equipment  and 
software, at declining prices and improving delivery times, is arguably at 
the root of the loss of business pricing power in recent years. (Greenspan, 
2000) 
The “loss of business pricing power” due to “labour-displacing equipment and software” 
is the crux of Marx’s law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit. This law, a crucial pillar 
of his theory of economic crisis, is a direct consequence of his value theory, particularly its 
key propositions that a commodity’s value is determined by the amount of labour needed 
to reproduce it and that aggregate price and profit are equal to aggregate value and 
surplus-value.  
At least in the case of the U.S. (I have not studied other countries), the law of 
the tendential fall in the rate of profit possesses remarkable explanatory power, and it is 
tremendously significant for an understanding of the long-run conditions that set the 
stage for the Great Recession. The chain of causation runs as follows: (1) As I will show 
presently,  the  law  accounts  for  almost  all  of  the  fall  in  the  rate  of  profit  of  U.S. 
corporations during the six decades preceding the latest crisis, and (2) the fall in the rate 
of profit fully accounts for the sharp fall in corporations’ rate of accumulation since the 
late 1970s. (3) The fall in the rate of accumulation is in turn the principal cause of the 
chronic slowdown in economic growth. (4) The slowdown in growth, the falling rate of 
profit,  and  governmental  policies  intended  to  ameliorate  the  effects  of,  and  perhaps 
reverse, the declines in growth and profitability have led to ever-rising debt burdens.20 
And (5) the massive burden of unpaid debt seems to be a crucial determinant of the 
length, severity, and persistent effects of the Great Recession.21 
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Figure 2.  Figure 2.  Figure 2.  Figure 2. The Rate of Profit and the Rate of Accumulation One The Rate of Profit and the Rate of Accumulation One The Rate of Profit and the Rate of Accumulation One The Rate of Profit and the Rate of Accumulation One- - - -Year Later, U.S.  Year Later, U.S.  Year Later, U.S.  Year Later, U.S. 
Corporations Corporations Corporations Corporations    
    
 
    
I cannot document all of these claims here, but points (3) through (5) are not very 
controversial. As for points (1) and (2), let us first look at the relationship between 
corporations’ rate of profit and their rate of accumulation of fixed assets.22 Figure 2 shows 
that  the  relationship  has  been  a  remarkably  tight  one  for  four  decades.  And  since 
movements in the rate of profit precede movements in the rate of accumulation by one or 
more years, the fall in the former fully explains the fall in the latter.   
 
Figure 3. Nominal and Adjusted Rates of Profit, U.S. Corporations Figure 3. Nominal and Adjusted Rates of Profit, U.S. Corporations Figure 3. Nominal and Adjusted Rates of Profit, U.S. Corporations Figure 3. Nominal and Adjusted Rates of Profit, U.S. Corporations    
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But why did the rate of profit fall? Well, one factor that can cause it to change is a change 
in income distribution between profits and compensation of employees. Another is a 
change in the relationship between the money and labour-time measures of value. For 
example, when money prices rise in relationship to the amount of labour that is needed to 
reproduce commodities, this will raise the nominal (money) rate of profit. To ascertain 
the  impact  of  these  factors,  I  computed  an  adjusted  rate  of  profit  that  holds  them 
constant, thereby eliminating them as sources of variation in the rate of profit. As Figure 3 
shows, they had very little effect on its trend in the long run. (Increases in money prices 
relative to labour-time values boosted the level of the nominal rate of profit substantially, 
but  they  had  almost  no  effect  on  its  long-run  trend).  Between  1947  and  2007,  the 
nominal rate of profit fell by 11.0 percentage points while the adjusted rate fell by 12.3 
points. 
Thus, in order to understand why the rate of profit, the rate of accumulation, 
and the rate of economic growth fell, we have to understand why the adjusted rate of 
profit fell. To understand the mathematical reason why it fell, note that the average age of 
the people in a room has to fall whenever a new person enters the room whose age is less 
than the average age. In the same way, the overall rate of profit has to fall whenever the 
rate of profit on new investments is less than the overall rate. (The rate of profit on new 
investments is the extra profit that results from an extra dollar invested.) Now, as Figure 4 
shows, the adjusted rate of profit on new investments was indeed consistently less than 
the overall adjusted rate of profit. So the overall rate had to fall.   
 
Figure 4. Adjusted Rates of Profit, Overall and on New Investments, U.S.  Figure 4. Adjusted Rates of Profit, Overall and on New Investments, U.S.  Figure 4. Adjusted Rates of Profit, Overall and on New Investments, U.S.  Figure 4. Adjusted Rates of Profit, Overall and on New Investments, U.S. 
Corporations Corporations Corporations Corporations 
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The economic reason why the adjusted rate of profit fell has to do with the fact that the 
adjusted rate on new investments, toward which it tends, is an extremely close proxy for 
the  ratio  of  (a)  the  growth  rate  of  employment  to  (b)  the  share  of  profit  that  is 
accumulated, i.e., spent on productive investments (see Kliman, 2011, pp. 132–34 for the 
derivation of this result). Thus, the overall adjusted rate of profit fell because the ratio of 
(a) to (b) was consistently below the current overall adjusted rate. In other words, the 
adjusted rate of profit, and thus the nominal rate of profit, experienced a persistent fall 
because,  throughout  the  entire  six  decades,  employment  increased  too  slowly  in 
relationship  to  the  accumulation  of  capital  to  allow  the  existing  rate  of  profit  to  be 
maintained. This is exactly how Marx’s law explains the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall (Marx, 1991, ch. 15). 
Additional Criticisms 
  
N&B  make  several  other  criticisms  of  Marx  in  their  discussion  of  his  theory  of  the 
relationship between values and prices. First, while Marx claimed to demonstrate, at the 
start of Capital, that the sole property that commodities have in common is that they are 
products of labour in the abstract, N&B endorse Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s famous 
counterargument that Marx arbitrarily ignored some other possible common properties 
– utility, scarcity, and the commodities’ existence as appropriated things. But Böhm-
Bawerk’s criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the object under investigation. At 
this point in Capital, Marx’s aim was to identify a common property, not to identify the 
factors that enable things to exchange as commodities. “It is quite true that the things 
could not exchange as commodities unless they were scarce, owned, and useful. But none 
of these is a property of the things themselves; all are relations between the things and 
people.  (Although the usefulness of things is dependent on their physical properties, 
usefulness itself is not such a property)” (Kliman, 2000, p. 105).   
  Second, N&B argue that it is not possible to “explain the trajectory of financial 
markets with Marxist tools” (p. 92). It is true, and Marx stressed at length, that there is no 
law of value underlying variations in interest rates. And for this and other reasons, there is 
only  a  tenuous  relationship  between  commodities’  values  and  the  prices  of  debt 
instruments. But if the tools that Marx employed count as “Marxist tools,” there is indeed 
a Marxist tool to explain interest-rate variations: the theory (which is not uniquely his) 
that they are determined by changes in the relationship between the supply of and the 
demand for loanable funds (see, e.g., Marx, 1991, p.  488). And the law of value can help 
explain equity-market phenomena such as the relationship between equity prices and 
companies’ profits. As I discussed above, Marx’s theory largely accounts for variations in 
U.S. corporations’ rate of profit, and between 1946 and 2008, the correlation between the 
(before- and after-tax) rates of profit and S&P 500 corporations’ earnings-to-price ratio Value and Crisis, Kliman
 
 
 
81 
of the following year was a far-from-negligible 0.595 (see Kliman, 2011, pp. 102–03). 
And Potts (2009, 2011) has employed Marx’s concept of ‘surplus capital’ in order to 
argue that asset bubbles form partly because investment in financial instruments may 
tend to increase when a fall in the rate of profit depresses productive investment. 
In any case, I do not see that the relative absence of ‘Marxist tools’ to explain 
financial phenomena is due to any inherent defect in his theories. If there are few such 
tools today, it is because Marx died before he could develop them – he noted in Capital 
that thorough analyses of credit markets and competition in the world market were 
“outside the scope of this work … they belong to a possible continuation” (Marx, 1991, p. 
205) – and because mainstream “Marxian economists,” who are staunch opponents of 
his work, have not wanted to develop them. 
Third,  N&B  claim  that  Paul  Samuelson  ‘demonstrated’  that  the 
transformation of values into prices of production is ‘pointless.’ Prices of production can 
be deduced directly from “real” data – physical input and outputs and real wages – 
“without  any  intermediate  resort  to  labour  values”  (p.  100).  But  Samuelson 
demonstrated  no  such  thing  about  Marx’s  transformation  of  values  into  prices  of 
production. He showed that values are not needed in order to deduce the ‘prices of 
production’  of  the  simultaneous  dual-system  revisions  (‘corrections’)  of  Marx.  The 
“redundancy” of value is purely a consequence of simultaneous valuation. If prices and 
values are determined temporally, physical data are not the only proximate determinants 
of relative prices or values (see Kliman, 2007, ch. 5, esp. pp. 79–81). 
  Finally, N&B argue that Michio Morishima and Ian Steedman demonstrated 
that “there is nothing inherent in joint production to guarantee” that commodities’ values 
are positive rather than negative, a result that is “potentially devastating for the labour 
theory of value” (p. 101). But if wool and mutton are only produced jointly, neither of 
them has a value on its own. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of 
labour needed to reproduce it, and in this case we cannot say how much labour is needed 
to reproduce either wool or mutton on its own. The very notion is meaningless. What has 
a value is the joint product. Kliman and McGlone (1999, pp. 45-48) provide a temporal 
single-system account of the determination of joint products’ values and prices. Their 
values cannot be negative, and all of Marx’s aggregate value-price equalities are preserved. 
 
C.  C.  C.  C. Labour Labour Labour Labour    
 
Productive and Unproductive Labour 
 
A whole chapter of Capital as Power is devoted to a critique of “the Marxist” distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour. But almost all of it is a critique of various Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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post-Marx Marxists’ writings on the topic. N&B have extremely little to say about Marx’s 
own distinction between productive and unproductive labour – which is quite surprising, 
given that hundreds of pages of his economic writings are devoted to it.  
  Marx is of course not responsible for what post-Marx Marxists have said, and I 
have no desire to take responsibility either. My response will therefore be limited to a 
discussion of the few things N&B say that have a bearing on Marx’s own distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour. 
  Their only critique of Marx’s distinction is the critical remark they make about 
his statement that an act of labour is productive only if it is “directly consumed in the 
course of production for the valorization of capital” (p. 120; from Marx, 1990b, p. 1038) 
[emphasis omitted]. On their interpretation, this means that the act of labour must be 
“tied to capital through the wage contract.” And the problem with Marx’s statement, they 
write, is that “even if we accept that capitalist control is a prerequisite for the creation of 
value, it is not clear why the only gauge for such control is the wage contract” (p. 120). 
But “tied to capital through the wage contract” – which is not even an adequate 
rendering of “directly exchanged with capital,” another condition that must be satisfied in 
order for labour to be productive – has little, if anything, to do with “directly consumed in 
the course of production for the valorization of capital.” Marx uses the phrase “directly 
consumed in the course of production” to distinguish between (a) human activity that is 
part of a particular act of production and (b) human activity that –  no matter how much 
it facilitates that act of production and no matter how necessary it may be for that act of 
production to take place – is not part of it. Activity (a) is productive if it also valorizes 
capital, i.e., creates surplus-value, while activity (b) is necessarily unproductive.  
To understand this more clearly, consider the objection of Pellegrino Rossi to 
Adam Smith’s distinction between productive and unproductive labour. Smith held that 
the labour of a magistrate is unproductive. Rossi argued against this that the magistrate’s 
labour is indirectly productive. Other acts of production are almost impossible without it. 
His labour therefore “contributes to [other acts of production], if  not by direct and 
material co-operation, at least by an indirect action which cannot be left out of account” 
(quoted in Marx, 1989, p. 190). Marx did not dispute the fact that it contributes in this 
manner, but he nonetheless rejected Rossi’s attempt to efface the distinction between 
productive  and  unproductive  labour:  “It  is  precisely  this  labour  which  participates 
indirectly in production (and it forms only a part of unproductive labour) that we call 
unproductive  labour.  Otherwise  we  would  have  to  say  that  since  the  magistrate  is 
absolutely  unable  to  live  without  the  peasant,  therefore  the  peasant  is  an  indirect 
producer of justice. And so on. Utter nonsense!” (Marx, 1989, p. 190). 
The following example will help to illustrate why the distinction between direct 
and  indirect  participation  in  production  is  crucial.  Every  workday,  workers  in  some 
company directly create $1000 of surplus-value. The manager puts the $1000 in a box in Value and Crisis, Kliman
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his office. But every day, one worker breaks into the office, takes the $1000, and pockets it. 
So the company hires a guard to prevent her from doing so. Because it has to pay the 
guard $100, the profit it keeps for itself is $900, which is less than the total surplus-value, 
but much more than the $0 profit it wound up with when the thefts were occurring. So 
the guard indirectly contributes to the company’s profit; indeed, if the company is to 
wind up with any profit at all, his labour is absolutely necessary. But the $1000 exists 
whether or not he shows up to work, so he does not directly create the surplus-value. To 
the contrary, the $100 he receives deprives the company of one-tenth of it. 
  The reason why I have belaboured the distinction between direct production 
and indirect participation in production is that N&B are either unfamiliar with it or, for 
some reason they do not explain, choose not to respect it. They repeatedly try to efface 
the distinction between productive and unproductive labour on the grounds that some 
activity that has been classified as unproductive contributes indirectly to the production 
of surplus-value. For instance, they try to complicate the issue by noting that, although 
financial  intermediation  is  often  classified  as  unproductive  activity,  it  “help[s]  guide 
reproduction” (p. 112). Employees of insurance companies do work that “serve[s] to 
provide stability for production” (p. 113). And don’t “government taxation, expenditures 
and subsidies, the legal code and the organized use of violence” “affect exchange values 
and surplus-values?” (p. 119). Yes; but they don’t directly create them. 
  The point of these efforts to complicate matters is to argue, first, that the 
distinction  between  productive  and  unproductive  labour  is  irredeemably  fuzzy.  And 
second,  since  Marx’s  value  theory  cannot  do  without  the  distinction,  it  is  likewise 
irredeemably fuzzy and must be abandoned.23 But it is N&B who are making them fuzzy, 
by ignoring the clear distinction between the direct creation of surplus-value and indirect 
contributions to its creation. 
 
Abstract and Concrete Labour, Simple and Complex Labour 
 
The term abstract labour refers to homogeneous labour, labour as such, in contrast to the 
variety of heterogenous concrete labours (waiting tables, truck-driving, etc.). In Marx’s 
theory,  abstract  labour  creates  value,  wealth  in  the  abstract,  while  concrete  labour 
produces use-values, useful material products and effects. But, N&B charge, “No one, 
from Marx onward, has been able to measure the unit of abstract labour,” so “Marxists do 
not even know what abstract labour looks like” (p. 143, p. 107). Consequently, the theory 
that the amount of abstract labour needed to reproduce commodities determines their 
values and aggregate prices is rubbish.  
Actually, it was quite clear to Marx what abstract labour “looks like,” because it is 
real work. And because it is real work, it is “measured in terms of time”: Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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The work is not done twice over, once to produce a suitable product, a use-value, to 
transform the means of production into products, and a second time to generate 
value and surplus-value, to valorize value. ... All that is contributed is the labour of 
spinning,  and  so  on,  and  through  this  contribution  more  yarn  is  continually 
produced. This real work creates value only if it is performed at a normally defined 
rate of intensity ...  and if this real work of given intensity and of given quantity as 
measured in terms of time actually materializes as a product. (Marx, 1990b, pp. 
991–992) 
So Marx resolved the problem that N&B pose by noting that “the work is not done twice 
over.”  Their claim that “Marxist political economy lack[s] a basic unit” (p. 7) is simply 
incorrect. 
But N&B, who are evidently unaware of the manner in which Marx actually 
specified the unit of abstract labour, write that “Marx resolves this problem, almost in 
passing, by resorting to another distinction – one that he makes between skilled labour 
and unskilled, or simple, labour” (p. 139). (An hour of skilled (or complex) labour counts 
as a multiple of an hour of unskilled labour; if it counts as double, it creates twice as much 
value.) N&B say that this latter way of specifying the unit of abstract labour is “difficult to 
accept”  because  “[t]he  very  parity  between  abstract  and  unskilled  labour  seems  to 
contradict Marx’s most basic assumption. For Marx, skilled and unskilled labour are two 
types of concrete labour whose characteristics belong to the qualitative realm of use 
value” (p. 139).  
But Marx did not specify the unit of abstract labour in this way, and it cannot 
properly be specified in this way. That is because, contrary to what N&B assert, skilled 
and unskilled labour are both abstract labour. Hence, the unit of abstract labour must 
already be identified before an hour of skilled labour can be counted as a multiple of 
unskilled labour.  
When  we  refer  to  simple  and  complex  labour,  we  do  not  refer  to  simple 
weaving-labour  or  complex  tailoring-labour,  and  so  on,  but  to  simple  and 
complex  labour-as-such.  The  commensuration  of  labours  that  produce 
different use-values is already presupposed. …  
Complex labour can be compared to, and thus reduced to a multiple of, simple 
labour, only because they lack any qualitative difference, i.e., only because both 
are abstract labour. As Marx [1990a, pp. 140–41] noted, ‘the magnitudes of 
different things only become comparable in quantitative terms when they have 
been reduced to the same unit’. Value and Crisis, Kliman
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… When … we consider doctoring-labour and janitoring-labour as labours of 
different kinds, it is meaningless to ask whether one is more skilled or complex 
than the other. Like can only be compared with like. 
To  compare  the  relative  complexity  of  these  two  labours,  their  qualitative 
differences must thus be set aside. (McGlone and Kliman 2004, pp. 138–39) 
The upshot of all this is that, even if it were impossible to reduce complex labour to a 
multiple of simple labour, Marxist political economy would still not lack a basic unit, 
because the basic unit—a unit of real work, measured in terms of time—is specified 
independently of and prior to the reduction of complex labour to simple labour.  
Not surprisingly, N&B doubt whether complex labour can be reduced to a 
multiple of simple labour:    
 
Now, skilled labour supposedly creates more value than unskilled labour, and 
the question is how much more? … 
 
Marx answered the question from the output side, by pointing to the greater 
‘physical productivity’ of skilled labour. His solution, though, is both circular 
and incomplete. It is circular insofar as physical productivity can be compared 
across different commodities only by resorting to prices and wages. (p. 142)  
 
I simply do not know what they are referring to here, and they provide no citation. Marx’s 
actual answer was completely different:  
 
All labour of a higher, or more complicated, character than average labour is 
expenditure  of  labour-power  of  a  more  costly  kind,  labour-power  whose 
production has cost more time and labour than unskilled or simple labour-
power, and which therefore has a higher value. This power being of a higher 
value,  it  expresses  itself  in  labour  of  a  higher  sort,  and  therefore  becomes 
objectified, during an equal amount of time, in proportionately higher values. 
(Marx, 1990a, p. 305) 
 
Thus, if the cost of reproducing the ability to do engineering work, when divided by the 
average number of hours an engineer works during his life, is $40, while the hourly cost of 
reproducing the ability to perform simple tasks is $10, then $40 and $10 are the hourly 
values of these two different kinds of labour-power, and the amount of value created 
during an hour of engineering work is likewise four times the amount of value created Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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during an hour spent performing simple tasks. If, for instance, an hour of simple labour 
creates $20 of new value, then an hour of engineering work creates $80 of new value. 
Notice that nothing in this answer appeals to the wages of the engineer or the regular 
worker.  
The answer does appeal implicitly to prices, such as tuition at engineering 
schools,  since  the  tuition  forms  part  of  the  cost  of  reproducing  the  ability  to  do 
engineering work. But the answer is not circular because, in Marx’s theory and in the 
temporal single-system interpretation of the theory, causation follows the arrow of time. 
The  price  paid  for  the  output,  the  product  or  service  that  the  engineer  provides,  is 
determined by, but not a determinant of, the amount of value an hour of his work creates. 
But why does an hour of his work create four times as much value as an hour of 
simple  labour?  Why  not  twice  as  much,  or  50%  more,  or  any  other  number?    As  I 
discussed  earlier  in  this  paper,  N&B  claim  that  “Marx  nowhere  explains  why  the 
additional value-creating capacity of skilled labour should bear any particular relationship 
to the labour cost of acquiring the skill” (p. 142). And this is why they regard his answer as 
incomplete. But he does explain why, in the final sentence of the passage I just quoted.  
It  can  be  explained  in  another  way  as  well:  self-interested  behavior  by 
companies  and  workers  will  induce  changes  in  the  cost  of  reproducing  engineering 
labour-power  that  tend  to  bring  about  the  proportionality  to  which  Marx  referred. 
Assume that an hour of the engineer’s work creates only 50% more value than an hour of 
simple labour, i.e., $30. Firms would not hire engineers unless they could pay them less 
than $30 an hour. But if they did so, engineers wouldn’t recoup the cost of going to 
engineering school, since $30 is much less than the $40 needed to reproduce engineering 
labour-power. So the supply of engineers would quickly evaporate.24 If that doesn’t occur, 
we can infer that an hour of engineering work creates more than 50% additional value.   
  But what if an hour of engineering work creates, say, 3.5 times as much value as 
an hour of simple labour, $70? Well, if we assume that people who perform simple labour 
are paid the value of their labour-power, $10, then, unless engineers’ hourly pay is $35 an 
hour or less, firms still get a bigger bang for the buck by hiring people to do simple labour. 
The ratio of the value created by simple labour to the hourly wage of a simple labourer is 
$20/$10 = 2, while the ratio of the value created by an hour of engineering work to the 
hourly pay of an engineer is less than 2 if they are paid more than $35 an hour. What 
would tend to happen, then, is that the demand for engineers would decline, and thus the 
supply of engineering students would decline. More costly engineering schools would 
shut  down.  Since  those  that  continued  to  operate  would  be  cheaper,  the  cost  of 
reproducing engineering labour-power would fall. It if fell from $40 to $35, the result 
would be that the cost of reproducing engineering labour-power would be 3.5 times the 
cost of reproducing simple labour-power, $10, and the amount of new value created by 
an hour of engineering labour, $70, would be 3.5 times the amount of new value created Value and Crisis, Kliman
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by an hour of simple labour. Marx’s proportionality would hold true exactly.  
Of course, the real world does not function in such a neat and frictionless 
manner, but it seems likely that Marx’s proportionality is a serviceable approximation to 
what occurs in the world of appearances, and the best one available. It is certainly not the 
arbitrary stipulation that N&B suggest it is. 
    
III. Conclusion III. Conclusion III. Conclusion III. Conclusion    
    
This paper has shown that Bichler and Nitzan have not provided us with good reasons to 
accept that belief in capitalism’s eternality is crucial to its continued existence, or that 
capitalists do normally believe that the system is eternal, or that they have come to fear its 
demise.  The  paper  has  also  sketched  out  an  alternative  approach  to  questions  of 
economic crisis and the future of capitalism rooted in Marx’s value theory, in the course 
of defending that theory against their charges that it is logically unsound and that the 
development of capitalism since Marx’s death has undermined his logic. By showing that 
none  of  Bichler  and  Nitzan’s  charges  holds  water,  it  has  eliminated  their  main 
justifications for their claim that their “capital as power” theory is needed as an alternative 
to Marx’s theory.  
Charges that his value theory is logically unsound serve to disqualify it at the 
starting  gate,  depriving  it  of  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  its  explanatory  power 
empirically. In contrast, my response to Bichler and Nitzan’s work, while quite critical, has 
not  tried  to  disqualify  their  theory  at  the  starting  gate,  on  a  priori  logical  grounds, 
irrespective of empirical evidence. They are entitled to their theory. Marx is also entitled 
to his.  
 
Notes Notes Notes Notes
 
1 They interpret a strong influence of current profits on share prices as evidence that 
investors  are  acting  on  the  basis  of  the  current  situation,  having  abandoned  their 
supposedly normal “conviction” that the shares will yield returns ad infinitum because 
capitalism is eternal. 
2  An  internally  inconsistent  theory  may  happen  by  accident  to  hit  upon  correct 
conclusions, but the arguments it provides in support of these conclusions are always 
invalid. 
3 The correlation was negative between February 1961 and May 1964. If we count this as 
a distinct period and shorten periods 4 and 5 accordingly, the correlations during these 
periods increase to 0.92 and 0.82. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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4 I computed a correlation of 0.65 for period 7, while B&N report a correlation of 0.64. 
My other results match theirs, so this slight discrepancy may be due to a recent revision 
of the data set. 
5 Since I, like B&N, computed the correlations between 3-year average values, periods 4 
and 5 use data from August 1950 through December 1973, which is almost exactly 
coextensive with the golden age as defined by Skidelsky (2010, p. 24) – the period 
“from 1951 to 1973.”  
6 In some experiments, shares pay a fixed dividend. In others, participants are told what 
the possible dividends are and the probabilities that each will be paid.  
7 As William James (1890, p. 163, emphasis omitted) noted, “the distinction … between 
the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state … is the sovereign means 
for believing what one likes in psychology and of turning what might become a science 
into a tumbling ground for whimsies.” 
8 When I cite page numbers below, but no authors or dates, I am referring to this book.  
9 The TSSI differs from the standard (simultaneous dual-system) interpretation, which 
creates the inconsistencies that are attributed to Marx, in two simple respects. First, it 
holds that Marx understood values and prices to be determined temporally, which 
means that the values and prices of inputs can differ from the values and prices of 
outputs.  Second,  it  holds  that  he  understood  value  and  price  magnitudes  to  be 
determined interdependently. For instance, the sum of capital value invested depends 
on the prices of the means of production that are purchased, while the total price of 
output depends on the amount of new value created by living labour. See Kliman 
(2007) for further discussion. 
10 They thus veer dangerously close to the postmodernism that they excoriate elsewhere 
(see, e.g., p. 2 n1). 
11 In Marx’s theory, a commodity’s value is determined exclusively by the average amount 
of labour needed to reproduce it. 
12 Since the TSSI does not try to show that Marx’s theory is true, it is actually irrelevant 
whether temporal valuation is the right “method to use.” The only relevant issues are 
whether he himself employed temporal valuation and whether his theory becomes 
internally consistent when it is interpreted as a temporal (and single-system) theory.  
13 They write that TSSI authors’ “purpose is to show that [Marx’s] framework is logically 
consistent and fully in agreement with his analytical claims. But in the process of 
achieving  this  purpose,  they  seem  to  have  shifted  into  reverse”  (p.  109,  emphasis 
added).  
14 In a certain sense, this is so; they are “converted” by means of the quotidian procedure, 
which Marx analyzed in chapter 1 of Capital, of expressing how much a product of Value and Crisis, Kliman
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labour is worth in terms of ounces of gold, dollars, etc., instead of in terms of labour-
hours. But N&B are referring to a distinct, analytical operation. 
15 They and I agree that it is “logically inconsistent and plagued by insoluble problems” (p. 
106) if it is not understood as a single-system theory. 
16 The value of each branch’s output is the sum of the value transferred from used-up 
means of production and the new value added by living labour. Because the example is 
too simple to illustrate the determination of the value transferred from used-up means 
of production, the relationship between the labour-time and money measures of value 
added, or output prices, I selected the magnitudes of these variables (and the amounts 
of value-creating living labour that are performed) arbitrarily. Thus the output prices 
could be prices of production, competitive market prices, monopoly prices, etc. The 
values  and  prices  of  output  are  in  real  rather  than  nominal  terms—i.e.,  they  are 
adjusted  for  any  changes  in  the  relationship  between  labour-time  and  money 
magnitudes that take place during the period—though Marx’s aggregate equalities 
hold true under the TSSI for nominal value and price variables as well. For further 
discussion  of  the  temporal  single-system  interpretation  of  Marx’s  account  of  the 
transformation of value into prices of production, see chs. 8 and 9 of Kliman 2007, esp. 
pp. 164–66. For further discussion of how the relationship between the labour-time 
and money measures of value is determined, see esp. pp. 185–89 of that work. 
17 I am referring here to the real magnitudes of these variables (see note 16 above). Their 
nominal levels are determined in a more complex manner. 
18 Potts (2007) explains that research and development expenditures do not augment 
commodities’ values, and he argues that this is why capitalists seek patents. 
19 My source is National Income and Product Accounts table 1.5.4, line 32, available from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis at bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp. 
20 For example, the ratio of U.S. Treasury debt to GDP increased by 71% between 1970 
and 2007, but it would have declined by 19% if corporate income taxes had not fallen 
as a share of GDP. These taxes fell as a share of GDP partly because the rate of profit 
fell––there  was  relatively  less  corporate  income  to  tax––and  partly  because  the 
government shifted much of the effect of falling profitability from corporations to the 
public at large by lowering corporate income tax rates. For further discussion of this 
issue, see Kliman 2011, pp. 55–57. 
21 “These broader problems of debt and deleveraging arguably explain why the successful 
stabilization of the financial industry has done no more than pull the economy back 
from the brink, without producing a strong recovery. The economy is hamstrung—
still crippled by a debt overhang” (Krugman and Wells, 2010). Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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22  Accumulation  of  fixed  assets  means  investment  in  equipment  and  software,  and 
spending to construct factories, office buildings, and other “structures.” The numerator 
of the rate of profit shown in Figure 2 is corporations’ net output (net value added) 
minus compensation (wages, salaries, and benefits) of employees. The numerator of 
the  rate  of  accumulation  is  corporations’  net  investment  in  fixed  assets.  The 
denominator of both rates is the net stock of fixed assets. All variables are valued at 
historical cost, and all data used to compute these variables and the derivative variables 
shown in Figures 3 and 4 come from the U.S. government. For further discussion of 
my data sources and computations, see Kliman 2011, chs. 5 and 7.  
23 See, e.g., their remarks about the distinction between capitalist production and other 
forms of social reproduction on p. 121. 
24 I am assuming here that the government does not subsidize their education. All else 
being  equal,  the  subsidy  is  a  wasted  expenditure  from  the  vantage  point  of  a 
government interested in augmenting value, since engineering work doesn’t “pay for 
itself” (i.e., create more value than the engineers receive once the subsidy is factored 
in). 
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